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In the last 3 years, the concept of resilience 
has received much attention in the health 
systems and global health literature, triggered 
by the Ebola outbreak in West Africa (which, 
in 2014, exposed a lack of health system and 
global health resilience) and followed in 
2016 by the Global Symposium on Health 
Systems Research (with the theme ‘Resilient 
and responsive health systems in a changing 
world’). Resilience has been widely embraced 
in the literature,1–5 and also by the immediate 
past6 and current7 WHO Director General. 
BMJ Global Health has also published several 
reports applying the concept of resilience to 
how health systems respond to acute shocks 
and chronic stress.8–10 
But there has also been persistent discom-
fort in the literature about the concept of 
resilience.11–13 While we find things to agree 
and disagree with in debates on and use of 
the concept of resilience by both its enthusi-
asts and critics, in our view, such debates and 
applications have been constrained by a lack 
of clarity on what resilience really means. 
The purpose of this editorial is therefore to 
propose a clear and intuitive definition of 
resilience that may inform future applica-
tions, and to ensure that future discussion and 
debates in the literature on what this concept 
brings to health systems and global health are 
based on a common understanding of the 
meaning of resilience.
In the wake of the 2014–2016 Ebola 
outbreak, the global health governance 
system and the health systems in the three 
affected West African countries were 
described as vulnerable.2 In the face of acute 
shock, the global and national health systems 
lacked the reserves to draw on and so enable 
appropriate response to the outbreak. They 
lacked resilience. For us, resilience implies 
adaptability in a context of robustness.14 But 
only the first half of this definition—adapt-
ability—has dominated conversations among 
both enthusiasts and critics. To be resilient, 
a system must have both, that is, a resilient 
system is adaptable by being robust. Adapt-
ability without robustness is not resilience.
Robustness is the capacity of a system to 
absorb and recover from shocks and stress, 
without major negative consequences.15 
Adaptability is the capacity of a system to 
adjust, reorganise, transform or modify in 
response to shocks and stress (including 
shifting demographic health patterns).15 
We argue that when adaptation takes place 
without an existing context of robustness, 
what happens is coping and not resilience, 
and when adaptation takes place within a 
context of robustness, what happens is resil-
ience. With resilience, a system’s response to 
shocks and stress may lead to corrections in 
the institutional design errors that rendered 
it vulnerable to shocks and stress in the first 
place.14–16
However, adaptation or corrections of insti-
tutional design errors are not always good. 
The concept of ‘over-optimisation’15 refers 
to the idea that responding (ie, optimising or 
adapting) a system to a known or anticipated 
shock or stress may go too far that it leaves 
the system more vulnerable (than before 
such optimisation) to an unknown or unan-
ticipated shock or stress.14 15 Thus, a response 
that confers resilience may also lead to 
vulnerability.14–16 While this risk of ‘over-op-
timisation’ has been hinted at by critics of 
the resilience agenda in health systems and 
global health,11 12 it has so far not received 
its due attention in the literature. We use 
the constitution of the USA as an example of 
institutional design to facilitate resilience, but 
with the risk of over-optimisation.
Having experienced exploitation by the 
British monarchy, the framers designed the 
institutions that would govern their new 
county with the presumption that ‘all men 
are knaves’17 18 (ie, all men—and women, 
of course—are dishonest and unscrupu-
lous). And in doing this, they recognised a 
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trade-off; that designing institutions to ensure that ‘bad 
men and women’ do the least harm would also ensure 
that ‘good men and women’ were not allowed to do 
good unchecked. Limiting the bad also meant limiting 
the good.17 18 Think, for those who like the idea, of the 
(im)possibility of having a national health system (or 
Universal Health Coverage) in the USA.
They constructed a decentralised, polycentric order 
with two main features: (1) horizontally, having multiple 
arms of government—that is, executive, legislature and 
judiciary—to check one another; and (2) vertically, 
having multiple levels of government—that is, national, 
state and local—essentially with the horizontal arms of 
government replicated at each level. The system was 
designed to function in such a way that, within a local 
jurisdiction, a service (say health services) may be 
provided by three levels of government, with oversight 
from three arms of government, thus creating ample 
back-up space with the involvement of as nine different 
centres of governance. If one centre of governance were 
to fail, there are many opportunities for others to step 
in; whether in their capacity to hold the failed centre 
accountable or to provide services that the failed level 
ought to have delivered.
This is what it means to govern for resilience; to design 
governance structures in anticipation of the worst; to 
govern with a sense of defence or security. Notably, a poly-
centric system of governance is not efficient—at least not 
in the short term. It is like insurance. It is an investment in 
anticipation of uncertain shock or stress. There are many 
decision centres in a polycentric system (including at the 
community level), each exercising a level of indepen-
dence to make, change, monitor and enforce rules in a 
jurisdiction.19 The absence of such polycentrism featured 
prominently in analyses of the limitations of various 
national responses to the West Africa Ebola outbreak, 
including weaknesses at the ‘collective level of gover-
nance’ (ie, community engagement in governance)20 the 
activities of which could foster ongoing trust and partner-
ship between services users and providers.21–23
In addition to enabling a back-up mechanism in 
times of trouble, a polycentric order can also reduce 
the potential spread of the impact of shocks or stress 
beyond a local jurisdiction that is under attack, increase 
the likelihood that a neighbouring local jurisdiction 
may be able to step in and support, and as governance 
is local, increase potential opportunities for experi-
mentation and learning from other jurisdictions, while 
also reducing the cost of turning back from errors 
that may lead to vulnerability. These errors may result 
from over-optimised response to shocks or stress that 
narrowly concentrate attention and resources.15 Thus, 
polycentrism, by strengthening governance at multiple 
centres in a manner that is agnostic to the nature of 
potential shocks or stress, fosters resilience and can also 
limit its negative consequences, such as over-optimisa-
tion, which may occur as systems are fitted for acute 
shocks (eg, an Ebola outbreak), but are left vulnerable 
to unanticipated or poorly attended chronic stressors 
(eg, the ‘slower burning’ non-communicable diseases).
While we want health systems that are prepared for, and 
can adapt to, environmental, disease and conflict-related 
shocks and stress, being able to cope with challenges is 
different from being resilient to shocks or stress. Resil-
ience is a desirable quality in a health system. Building 
resilience, especially in fragile, weakly governed systems 
such as post-conflict settings, is important. But there are 
other worthy aspirations for health systems that go beyond 
resilience. Health system strengthening—in a compre-
hensive sense, which includes efforts to achieve Universal 
Health Coverage—often requires a reimagining of estab-
lished orders of how systems are governed. Resilience is 
one of the principles that must inform reforms to achieve 
these goals, but there are others. Resilience is not quality, 
it is not rights, it is not coverage, it is not equity and it is 
not financial protection.
There is a tendency among enthusiasts of the concept 
to frame resilience as coping (ie, adaptation without 
robustness) and at the individual level—that is, as 
people digging deep as they draw on internal strengths 
and resources to make up for weaknesses in the health 
system in the face of acute shocks or chronic stress. But 
this framing is susceptible to the critique that resilience 
condones weaknesses, and that it distracts from focusing 
on health system strengthening, and the design and 
nurturing of robust governance structures and relations 
in local health systems and global health governance.11 12 
Those who argue against framing resilience as coping 
are therefore right to be concerned that when people 
with power expect the poor and disadvantaged to stretch 
themselves so that a system is able to cope in the face 
of challenges, it takes away from any determination to 
address those challenges. Indeed, framing resilience as 
coping may have specific appeal to powerful actors for 
this reason.
Even when we define and frame resilience as adapta-
tion with robustness, we must be aware that ‘over-optimisa-
tion’ may arise from an uncritical approach to promoting 
health system strengthening through resilience. The 
focus such an agenda brings on anticipating, preparing 
for and responding to acute shocks may stymy our 
capacity or willingness to be bold in our vision, as efforts 
to strengthen health systems are refocused away from the 
hard grind of responding to chronic stresses that do not 
manifest as acute shocks. Despite its conceptual align-
ment with systems thinking, a focus on resilience may 
thus paradoxically increase the risk of ignoring the way in 
which current alignments of interconnected actors and 
structures underpin dysfunctional health systems. We 
urge advocates of health system strengthening to deliber-
ately promote resilience as adaptation with robustness; with 
health system strengthening as a precondition for resil-
ience—not the other way around.24
This is by no means the final word on the definition 
of resilience. However, we urge researchers, practitioners 
and policy-makers in health systems and global health 
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to adopt a definition of resilience that goes beyond 
coping (important as it is to highlight); to emphasise 
health system strengthening as a precondition for health 
system resilience; to explore how to design and nurture 
polycentric governance structures and relations that 
promote resilience; and to investigate the different ways 
in which over-optimisation that sometimes results from 
governing for resilience may function to the detriment 
of health systems and global health, the distinction and 
overlap between the two constructs—adaptability and 
robustness—by which we have defined resilience, and the 
emerging conceptual maturity of resilience in the health 
system and global health literature.25 BMJ Global Health 
is keen to receive, consider and support such works for 
publication.
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